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By integrating previous computational models of corticohippocampal function, the authors develop and
test a unified theory of the neural substrates of familiarity, recollection, and classical conditioning. This
approach integrates models from 2 traditions of hippocampal modeling, those of episodic memory and
incremental learning, by drawing on an earlier mathematical model of conditioning, SOP (A. Wagner,
1981). The model describes how a familiarity signal may arise from parahippocampal cortices, giving a
novel explanation for the finding that the neural response to a stimulus in these regions decreases with
increasing stimulus familiarity. Recollection is ascribed to the hippocampus proper. It is shown how the
properties of episodic representations in the neocortex, parahippocampal gyrus, and hippocampus proper
may explain phenomena in classical conditioning. The model reproduces the effects of hippocampal,
septal, and broad hippocampal region lesions on contextual modulation of classical conditioning,
blocking, learned irrelevance, and latent inhibition.
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Many recent theories of hippocampal functioning are variants of
the idea that the hippocampus, or more broadly the hippocampal
region (hippocampus proper; dentate gyrus; subiculum; and ento-
rhinal, perirhinal, and parahippocampal cortices), stores episodic
memories (Eichenbaum, 1992; Hasselmo & Wyble, 1997; Marr,
1971; McClelland & Goddard, 1996; Meeter & Murre, in press;
Meeter, Talamini, & Murre, 2004; Norman & O’Reilly, 2003;
Talamini, Meeter, Murre, Elvevåg, & Goldberg, in press). In its
strictest definitions, episodic refers to the memories for an unstruc-
tured array of things that were present or events that occurred at
one specific location and moment in time. Evidence that the
hippocampus plays a role in storing such memories comes from
electrophysiological recordings (Eichenbaum, 2000; Ferbintineau
& Shapiro, 2003; O’Keefe, 1979), functional imaging (Cabeza &
Nyberg, 2000), patient data (Reed & Squire, 1998; Rempel-
Clower, Zola, Squire, & Amaral, 1996; Scoville & Milner, 1957),
and lesion studies with experimental animals (Gilbert, Kesner, &
Lee, 2001; Jarrard, 1995).
However, lesion data have also implicated the hippocampal
region in tasks that do not conform very well to the episodic label.
These findings, discussed below, suggest that the hippocampus has
a role in what is usually referred to as associative learning (Pearce
& Bouton, 2001) or incremental learning (Gluck, Meeter, & My-
ers, 2003). Both names are apt, as this domain involves tasks in
which the learner is required to associate a set of stimuli or a state
of the environment with a behavioral output. Moreover, the output
usually develops over tens or hundreds of trials. This is a far cry
from episodic memory tasks, which often require retrieval after
just one presentation of a certain material.
Findings from the incremental learning literature have led to a
second strain of theories of the hippocampal region. The hip-
pocampal region is theorized to aid the slow development of the
correct representations to support behavioral performance (Gluck
& Myers, 1993; Schmajuk & DiCarlo, 1992). In classical condi-
tioning, for example, this may take the form of developing repre-
sentations that distinguish conditions predictive of an uncondi-
tioned stimulus and conditions that predict no such stimulus will
occur. The hippocampal region may thus slowly alter and adapt
representations in response to environmental feedback (i.e., re-
wards, punishments, unconditioned stimuli).
The two groups of theories, those concerned with episodic
memory and those addressing incremental learning, seem diamet-
rically opposed in the demands they pose to hippocampal func-
tioning. Incremental learning is sensitive to behavioral outcome,
whereas episodic learning is thought of as unsupervised, automatic
coding of whatever is present. Episodic learning is fast (often one
trial), whereas incremental learning is slow. It is not immediately
obvious how a model could reconcile episodic and incremental
learning in a parsimonious way. Here, we present a model that
attempts to do just that—reconcile episodic memory with incre-
mental learning. The conceptual glue that binds these two ap-
proaches is an earlier mathematical model of conditioning, the
sometimes opponent processing, or SOP, model (Wagner, 1981).
The model is able to account for the basic phenomena of episodic
memory as well as for classic findings in the conditioning litera-
ture. Moreover, it offers a novel explanation for a puzzling finding
from neurophysiology, namely that familiarity decreases (rather
than increases) neural responses to familiar stimuli (Li, Miller, &
Desimone, 1993; Xiang & Brown, 1998).
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In the remainder of this article, we first outline the two strains
of models and some of the evidence for the roles of the hippocam-
pal region in different kinds of memory. Then we present our
model, both in its theoretical basis and in its applications to
concrete data. Although it is applicable to a wide range of memory
tasks, we focus in this article on what may be seen as two
extremes: explicit episodic memory and classical conditioning.
The article ends with a discussion of the merits and limitations of
the model, a comparison with other models, and a list of untested
predictions.
Role of Hippocampal Region in Episodic Memory
The role of the hippocampus in memory has been the focus of
many qualitative theories and computational models (Eichenbaum,
1992; Hasselmo & Wyble, 1997; Marr, 1971; McClelland &
Goddard, 1996; Meeter, Murre, & Talamini, 2002; Meeter et al.,
2004; Norman & O’Reilly, 2003; Talamini et al., in press). These
models have assumed that the hippocampal region simply stores
whatever pattern is presented to it by the neocortex. Input from the
neocortex is modeled as arbitrary vectors to be stored. The hip-
pocampal region forms a compact code that is bidirectionally
linked to such neocortical representations. If a partial cue can later
reactivate this compact code, it can retrieve the neocortical repre-
sentation in its entirety.
The hippocampus is not the only structure involved in episodic
memory. Parahippocampal cortices adjacent to the hippocampus
have also been implicated in memory, especially in the processing
of stimulus familiarity (Aggleton & Brown, 1999; Davachi, Mitch-
ell, & Wagner, 2003; Ranganath et al., 2004; Zhu, McCabe,
Aggleton, & Brown, 1997). Areas of the neocortex, down to
unimodal primary cortices, play a role too: retrieval of visual
memories will activate not only the medial temporal lobe but also
visual areas down to primary visual area V1 (Cabeza & Nyberg,
2000; Reber & Squire, 1998). In line with these findings, lesions
to visual neocortical areas in the occipital lobe can cause amnesia
for visual details (Ogden, 1993).
Damage to the basal forebrain can also cause a dense amnesia,
suggesting a role in memory (Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000).
Within this set of structures, the importance of the medial septum
for hippocampal functioning has often been stressed (Hasselmo &
Bower, 1993; Hasselmo & Wyble, 1997; Meeter et al., 2004;
Myers et al., 1996; Rokers, Mercado, Allen, Myers, & Gluck,
2002), as it is the main source of acetylcholine in the hippocampus
(Alonso, Sang, & Amaral, 1996). Because acetylcholine facilitates
learning (Hasselmo, 1999), the medial septum may thus control the
learning process within the hippocampus.
From these findings rises a view of memories as a set of rich,
modality-specific representations stored in the neocortex, bound
together by high-level compound representations stored in the
hippocampus (Murre, 1996; Teyler & DiScenna, 1986). This dis-
tinction between representations of different complexity need not
be viewed as a dichotomy; in fact, representations of intermediate
complexity may exist in areas such as the parahippocampal gyrus.
A natural view of episodic memories would thus be a hierarchy of
representations all bound together, with low-level features stored
in the neocortex and integrated by higher level representations in
the hippocampal region (Talamini et al., in press). The septum may
fit in this story as the controller of the learning rate in the
hippocampus.
Role of the Hippocampal Region in Incremental Learning
In classical conditioning, subjects learn that a previously neutral
stimulus (the conditioned stimulus [CS]) precedes a response-
evoking stimulus (the unconditioned stimulus [US]). With time,
they learn to give an anticipatory or preparatory response (the
conditioned response [CR]) to the CS. Such conditioning can be
analyzed rather successfully as the learning of relations between
stimuli and motor outputs. Where stimuli and outputs are con-
nected in the brain has remained a difficult question, but of some
brain regions, it is now clear that they are important in condition-
ing. For classical conditioning, the cerebellum plays a major role
(Steinmetz, 1998; Thompson, 1990). The basal ganglia are known
to be involved in operant conditioning and to code for rewards
(Lauwereyns, Watanabe, Coe, & Hikosaka, 2002; Pagnoni, Zink,
Montague, & Berns, 2002; Peoples, Uzwiak, Gee, & West, 1997).
In fear conditioning, the amygdala has been identified as a central
structure (LeDoux, 1996).
These structures are not the only important ones. Conditioning
can occur to very complex stimuli as well as to simple ones, such
as an entire environment in contextual fear conditioning
(Fanselow, 2000). It is unlikely that the structures enumerated
above do the necessary stimulus processing, as they are small
relative to the size of the whole brain. More likely, they take
advantage of processing elsewhere in the brain, using processed,
high-level representations as their input.
Indeed, there are several lines of evidence that point to the
importance of neocortical processing areas for conditioning. Pri-
mary sensory cortices have, for example, been found to reorganize
themselves under influence of contingencies in conditioning tasks
(Recanzone, Schreiner, & Merzenich, 1993). In addition, the hip-
pocampal region seems to have a role in incremental learning, as
is suggested by electrophysiological recordings during condition-
ing tasks: During eyeblink conditioning, hippocampal neural ac-
tivity develops in response to a CS, and its shape and duration
mimic the CR (Berger & Thompson, 1978a).
Hippocampal involvement in incremental learning is also evi-
dent from the effects of hippocampal lesions on conditioning
paradigms. Although, for example, classical conditioning itself is
not slowed by hippocampal damage (Schmaltz & Theios, 1972;
Shohamy, Allen, & Gluck, 2000), animals with lesions in the
hippocampal region will in many variations of the basic paradigm
perform differently than normal animals. Animals with lesions to
the hippocampus and overlaying cortex do not show the decreased
rates of responding typically seen in intact ones when conditioned
stimuli are presented in a different context than the one in which
conditioning took place (Penick & Solomon, 1991). They also do
not show the temporary dip in responding that occurs in intact
animals when a CS predictive of a US is suddenly accompanied by
another stimulus (Allen, Padilla, Myers, & Gluck, 2002).
The broader hippocampal region (including adjacent parahip-
pocampal cortices and the subiculum) seems to be important for
latent inhibition and learned irrelevance. In latent inhibition, the
CS is presented many times to the animal in the environment in
which training will take place, prior to training. When training
starts and the CS is followed by a US, the animal is severely
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slowed down acquiring the CS–US association (Lubow & Moore,
1959). In learned irrelevance, the animal is first subjected to many
explicitly uncorrelated presentations of the stimulus and the US.
When in the training phase the CS is reliably followed by the US,
learning the CS–US association is slowed relative to a control
condition in which animals do not receive the uncorrelated preex-
posure (Mackintosh, 1973). Both phenomena, which tap complex
learning about environmental contingencies, are abolished after
hippocampal region ablations (Ackil, Mellgren, Halgren, & From-
mer, 1969; Allen, Chelius, & Gluck, 2002; Han, Gallagher, &
Holland, 1995).
Gluck and Myers’s (1993) Model of Incremental Learning
One theory of incremental learning, Gluck and Myers’s (1993)
model, has accounted for these effects of hippocampal lesions by
modeling the broader hippocampal region as a predictive autoen-
coder, which interacts with a simpler module representing the
cerebellum (see Figure 1). The task of this autoencoder is to
predict its environment, including the presence or absence of all
stimuli, including CSs, contextual stimuli, and a US, if any. This
leads to the formation of representations that the autoencoder can
use to predict an upcoming US. With the predictive encoder intact,
the model reproduces standard phenomena in the conditioning
literature. With the autoencoder lesioned, it reproduces the above-
mentioned effects of hippocampal lesions on conditioning.
Several features of autoencoders help to make Gluck and My-
ers’s (1993) model a good model of the hippocampal role in
classical and operant conditioning. Autoencoders will compress
features that consistently occur together (i.e., have the same pre-
dictive value). Features that do not occur together will, conversely,
be differentiated. This explains the model’s performance in para-
digms in which contextual discrimination plays a role: A stimulus
A may be rewarding in context X, but not in context Y, whereas it
is the other way round for a stimulus B. A simple neural network
such as a perceptron cannot solve this nonlinear problem, because
its response to A and X together is by necessity the sum of its
responses to A and X separately, and neither on its own will predict
the reward. The model solves this problem by developing a sep-
arate representation for the compound of A and X, and this com-
pound can then predict occurrence of the reward (Myers & Gluck,
1994).
The tendency of autoencoders to compress features that occur
together also explains paradigms such as latent inhibition and
learned irrelevance. In these paradigms stimulus and context be-
come bound into a single representation during exposure, in which
neither predicts anything other than itself. This works against
subsequent learning to respond in the presence of the CS but not
the context alone.
Another feature of autoencoders is that the amount of learning
taking place is a function of prediction error. If the error is large,
as it will be at the onset of learning, learning takes big steps. If,
after training, the error is small (i.e., the autoencoder can predict its
environment and the US), learning will be slow. This explains
blocking, a paradigm in which a CS is paired with a US at a
moment that the US is already well predicted. In blocking, an
animal first goes through many trials in which a stimulus A is
paired with a US. When the animal reliably makes a CR to the
stimulus, stimulus A is presented in combination with a novel
stimulus B, and that compound is still followed by the US. When,
after many such trials stimulus B is presented on its own, animals
typically emit CRs only at very low rates (Kamin, 1969). No
stimulus B–CR link has been made, even though stimulus B was
predictive of a US on all trials in which it was presented. In Gluck
and Myers’s (1993) model, this is explained by the fact that the
animal makes no errors during training on the compound, as it
already emits CRs to stimulus A. Without errors to be corrected, no
learning occurs in the cerebellar network in which CSs and CRs
are connected (this explanation essentially follows from the
Rescorla–Wagner rule discussed in a later section).
Limitations of the Model
The hippocampal role in many incremental learning paradigms
can thus be captured by the mathematics of error-correction learn-
ing that underlies predictive autoencoders. Three features stand
out: that the model can form representations at the right level of
complexity (i.e., it forms compound or differentiated representa-
tions as needed), that its hippocampal network learns swiftly only
when a stimulus has not already been incorporated into the context,
and that it learns new CS–CR associations only when a US is not
yet well predicted.
Nevertheless, there are clear grounds for improvement on the
model. One is that the model does not clearly map to brain
anatomy. For example, the model has one module for the hip-
pocampal region and can thus not differentiate the role of the
hippocampus proper from that of the surrounding areas. Another is
that the model does not provide any account of episodic memory
in the hippocampus. A third is that error-correction learning may
Figure 1. The corticohippocampal model of Gluck and Myers (1993).
The model receives inputs representing conditioned stimuli, such as lights
and tones, as well as contextual information. One network, representing
processing that is dependent on the hippocampal region, learns to recon-
struct these inputs and also to predict arrival of the unconditioned stimulus
(US), such as a corneal airpuff. As the hippocampal-region network does
this, it forms new stimulus representations in its internal layer that com-
press redundant information and differentiate predictive information. A
second network, assumed to represent long-term memory sites in cerebral
and cerebellar cortices, adopts the internal representation provided by the
hippocampal-region network and then maps from this to an output that
represents the strength or probability of a conditioned response (CR), such
as a protective eyeblink. Adapted from “Hippocampal Mediation of Stim-
ulus Representation: A Computational Theory,” by M. A. Gluck and C. E.
Myers, 1993, Hippocampus, 3, p. 495. Copyright 1993 by Wiley.
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indeed occur in the cerebellum, but it has not been shown to take
place in the hippocampus. The necessary prediction error signal
has never been identified there, and neither has a response com-
mensurate with error reduction. Below, we present a model that
takes over many features of Gluck and Myers’s (1993) model but
seeks to remedy the limitations just noted.
Incremental and Episodic in One Model
At the heart of our model is a welding of two theories: Gluck
and Myers’s (1993) model and a generic version of an episodic
memory model. From Gluck and Myers’s (1993) model, our model
takes an architecture in which a hippocampal memory system
interacts with more output-oriented brain structures. But the au-
toencoder hippocampal submodel is replaced by a multilayer
model capable of forming episodic memories (Meeter et al., 2002;
Talamini et al., in press). This simple model of episodic memory,
as shown in Figure 2, contains three layers in which stimuli and,
more broadly, the environment of the organism are represented.
An input layer, modeling the neocortex, codes for stimuli and
context features. A second layer stands for the parahippocampal
region: the perirhinal, entorhinal, and postrhinal–parahippocampal
cortices. This layer has integrated representations, with some parts
coding mostly for context features and some mostly for stimuli, but
with all parts also getting input of the other kind. The third layer
stands for the hippocampus proper, with nodes representing den-
tate granule cells and/or pyramidal cells in Ammon’s horn. This
hippocampal layer forms a compact code for the whole situation in
which the organism finds itself, for which we use the term ensem-
ble (Murnane, Phelps, & Malmberg, 1999). Such representations
form the basis of episodic memory.
To simulate incremental learning tasks, the model has to contain
modules coding for the outputs of memory. For classical condi-
tioning, the cerebellum is most relevant, but for other tasks of
incremental learning, one would have to include output regions for
rewards and operant behaviors (basal ganglia) and for fear re-
sponses (amygdala). The cerebellar circuit, the only output struc-
ture implemented here, is a simplified version of the cerebellar
network in Gluck and Myers’s (1993) model. All three represen-
tational layers project to the output modules. These connections
allow the output modules to attach behavioral significance to
simple and complex representations of the same set of stimuli,
thereby allowing stimulus configurations to have different associ-
ations than the constituent stimuli on their own.
Multilevel Representations
This may explain one feature of Gluck and Myers’s (1993)
model, the formation of compound and single representations.
Instead of representations at the right level of complexity being
slowly formed through error-correction learning, they may be
formed automatically in episodic memory on the first presentation
of the stimuli. Conditioning may then proceed by associating
events such as the occurrence of a US with episodic representa-
tions at the right level of complexity.
Consider the following example: A simple stimulus such as a
tone is coded for in the neocortical layer of the model. This same
tone, mixed in with contextual elements, is coded for in the
parahippocampal layer. The hippocampal layer has one compound
representation that stands for the ensemble of all available cues—
that is, the situation in which the animal finds itself. An outcome
can now be connected to the neocortical representation, as in
simple conditioning to a tone independent of the context in which
the tone occurs (connection labeled “a.” in Figure 2). It can also be
connected to a parahippocampal representation, which in this
model would be equivalent to conditioning to a tone in a context
(connection labeled “b.” in Figure 2). Finally, it can be connected
to a hippocampal representation, which would be equivalent to
conditioning to a whole situation (connection labeled “c.” in Fig-
ure 2). In most cases all three associations may develop at the same
time. It may also be, however, that over the course of many
learning trials, low-level features are associated with other out-
comes than compounds of the same stimuli. This would be the case
in contextually modulated conditioning.
Effects of Outcome Predictability
In addition to its ability to form representations of the right
complexity, the second feature mentioned above of Gluck and
Myers’s (1993) model is its ability to learn at the right time.
Speeded acquisition of a CR or an operant response occurs only
when an unpredicted outcome is presented together with a novel
stimulus. When a stimulus loses its novelty before it is combined
with an unpredicted outcome, both the model and experimental
animals suffer from learned irrelevance or latent inhibition. When
the novel stimulus occurs after the outcome has lost its unpredict-
ability, blocking will impede learning.
Figure 2. Brain regions that play a role in incremental learning and that
are part of the model. Representations are assumed to be formed in a
hierarchy of regions. All stimuli have a basic neocortical representation.
They are also represented in the parahippocampal gyrus (parahippocam-
pus), but here stimulus representations are loaded with context. In the
hippocampus, stimuli and context are bound together in holistic ensembles.
These representations form under the influence of acetylcholine (ACh). All
three representational layers are assumed to project to output regions.
These are the cerebellum for classical conditioning, the basal ganglia for
operant conditioning, and the amygdala for fear conditioning. Of these,
only the cerebellum is implemented in the model. a, b, and c: Different
kinds of information that can form the basis for classical conditioning; see
the main text for further explanation.
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The effects of outcome predictability on learning are captured
very well by the Rescorla–Wagner rule of associative learning
(Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). This rule assumes that the amount of
learning taking place at any one trial is a function of how well the
outcome is, on that trial, predicted by all cues taken together (see
the Appendix for a mathematical formulation). When an outcome
paired with a CS is already predicted by other cues, no learning to
the CS will take place, and blocking ensues. The circuitry in the
cerebellum has been shown to indeed implement the Rescorla–
Wagner rule (Kim, Krupa, & Thompson, 1998; Thompson &
Gluck, 1991), and it is part of both Gluck and Myers’s (1993)
model and the cerebellar network of our current model. The
current model thus explains blocking in the same way as Gluck
and Myers’s (1993) model does.
In classical conditioning, learning is thus explicitly dependent
on prediction failure. Although not directly relevant to the current
work, it is important to note that a dependence of learning on
outcome predictability is also plausible for kinds of incremental
learning involving different brain regions. In the basal ganglia,
long-term potentiation (LTP), a candidate mechanism for long-
term memory, is enhanced by dopamine (Thomas & Malenka,
2003), a neuromodulator. Electrophysiological data suggest that
dopamine release reflects the unpredictability of current rewards
(Schultz, 1998, 2002). These two facts together imply that learning
in the basal ganglia is fast when unpredicted rewards occur and
slow once a reward is well predicted. Operant conditioning,
thought to rely at least partly on the basal ganglia (Lauwereyns et
al., 2002; Pagnoni et al., 2002; Peoples et al., 1997), may thus be
governed by the same rules as classical conditioning. In fear
conditioning, Fanselow (1998) has argued that the interplay be-
tween opioid receptors and fear elicitors in the amygdala may be
equivalent to the Rescorla–Wagner rule. In particular, if an animal
has learned a fear response to a CS, this CS may elicit the release
of endogenous opioids, which dampens the effect of the negative
reinforcer. In this way, the reinforcing effect of a fear elicitor may
decrease during learning, as it does in the Rescorla–Wagner rule.
Stimulus Novelty, SOP, and Familiarity
As described above, stimulus novelty also affects incremental
learning. These effects have been formalized in other theories of
associative learning (Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980), one
of which is sometimes opponent processes, or SOP (Wagner,
1981). Although SOP has many subtleties, the mechanism by
which novelty affects incremental learning is fairly straightforward
(see also Donegan, Gluck, & Thompson, 1989). The theory as-
sumes that stimulus representations can be in one of two states
(three, if one includes absolute quiescence). When a stimulus is
novel to the animal, it will on presentation bring its representation
into a very active state, A1. Later, when the stimulus has been
presented often in a certain context, the animal will come to expect
the stimulus in that context. In this case, when the stimulus is
presented, its representation enters in a lower state of activity, A2.
SOP assumes that a stimulus representation can be associated with
a US only when it is in State A1, not in A2. In latent inhibition, the
stimulus is first presented alone for a number of trials. At the end
of this preexposure, the stimulus will elicit only A2 activity.
Because learning does not take place in A2, associating the stim-
ulus with the US will be retarded, relative to a nonexposed control
condition in which the stimulus is novel and hence in A1. SOP also
predicts that latent inhibition is reduced or eliminated by a change
in context between preexposure and training phases: The new
context will not be associated with the stimulus and will therefore
not bring it into State A2 on presentation. This release from latent
inhibition following context shift has indeed been found (Mack-
intosh, Kaye, & Bennett, 1991; Symonds & Hall, 1995).
SOP can be contrasted with a development in the episodic
memory field. Since the 1970s, many researchers in the field of
episodic recognition memory have argued that recognition judg-
ments need not be based on retrieval of the item to be recognized
but can also be based on a more fuzzy feeling that the item matches
old memories (e.g., Atkinson & Juola, 1974; Humphreys, Bain, &
Pike, 1989; Jacoby, 1991; Mandler, 1980; Yonelinas, 2002). These
two kinds of memory are often referred to as recollection and
familiarity. Recollection is the retrieval of a particular memory, as
when an item must be reproduced in recall tasks. Familiarity is a
signal computed through a comparison of a memory probe with all
memories in the memory store. During a recognition task, the
probe is thought of as eliciting a strong familiarity signal if it
resembles some or many stored memories. Formalized in compu-
tational models of recognition, the contribution of the familiarity
signal can explain many dissociations between recognition and
recall (Humphreys et al., 1989; Norman & O’Reilly, 2003; Raaij-
makers & Shiffrin, 1992).
Lesion studies (Aggleton & Brown, 1999), electrophysiological
evidence (Zhu et al., 1997), and imaging data (Ranganath et al.,
2004) have all implicated the perirhinal cortex in familiarity. In the
models, familiarity is modeled as an increase in a scalar signal
coming out of the memory system. When neural responses in the
perirhinal cortex to novel and familiar stimuli are directly com-
pared, however, results seem to contradict this idea. Instead of
being larger for familiar stimuli, neural responses to a stimulus
decrease in the perirhinal cortex with increasing familiarity (Li et
al., 1993; Xiang & Brown, 1998). Although these results (see, e.g.,
Figure 3) contradict many theories of familiarity, they are exactly
what one would expect from SOP: a state of high activity at the
first presentations, with less activity being elicited by an oft-
repeated stimulus. Here, we suggest that the familiarity effect, the
decreased parahippocampal response to familiar stimuli, is what
causes the effects of stimulus novelty on the speed of conditioning.
This leaves open how this familiarity effect is caused.
A Theory of Familiarity
The decrease in firing for familiar stimuli effects may result
from the interaction between a few uncontroversial neural mech-
anisms. The basic idea is that stimulus representations may always
partly reflect the latest context in which they were seen. This will
make them responsive to that context on itself, which will in turn
lead to less responsiveness to the stimulus if presented in the same
context because of adaptation and accommodation.
Figure 4 shows how a parahippocampal node may come to
represent context as well as its preferred stimulus. The input to the
parahippocampal gyrus during an experiment consists of a phasic
input when a stimulus is briefly presented and of more or less
continuous stimuli that together represent context (e.g., relatively
constant features of the physical environment). We assume that
each parahippocampal node receives one strong connection from
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the input it codes for and weak connections from other inputs.
Although this is a gross simplification, the underlying idea that
parahippocampal cells have preferred stimuli is well supported
(see below).
In Figure 4a, connections for one parahippocampal node coding
for a stimulus are drawn in. This node receives a strong connection
from a lower layer node coding for its preferred stimulus, but other
inputs, together forming the context, also reach it. If the preferred
stimulus is presented, the node will fire strongly, and the weak
connections from contextual inputs will be strengthened through
LTP. These connections may now be strong enough to make the
node fire at a low rate when its preferred stimulus is absent (see
Figure 4b). This in turn will lead to adaptation in the node. When
the preferred stimulus is presented again in that context, the node
will be in a less responsive state because of the built-up adaptation
(see Figure 4c). It will therefore respond at a lower rate than when
the stimulus was first presented. Exactly this pattern has been
found in perirhinal and entorhinal neurons (Li et al., 1993; Xiang
& Brown, 1998).
On a side note, firing decrements have not yet been observed in
the parahippocampal cortex. This seems at odds with our inclusion
of the parahippocampal cortex in the substrate of our parahip-
pocampal layer. The parahippocampal cortex relays spatial layout
information, among other things, to the hippocampus (Bohbot,
Allen, & Nadel, 2000; Vann, Brown, Erichsen, & Aggleton, 2000),
and we felt it was important to include this source of hippocampal
inputs in our model. To our knowledge, it has not been investi-
gated whether parahippocampal neurons show a familiarity firing
decrement for preferred stimuli (this is the case in our model, but
it plays no role in the current simulations).
Summary of the Model
In summary, we propose a new model of brain regions involved
in learning and memory. With it we hope to elucidate phenomena
from the literature of episodic memory and classical conditioning.
The model contains three layers that form representations and that
stand for the neocortex, the parahippocampal gyrus, and the hip-
pocampus proper (see Figure 2). Of the output regions in Figure 2,
only the cerebellum is implemented for this article. The basic
assumptions of the theory behind our model, as presented above,
are listed below. A comparison of these assumptions with those of
other models is addressed in the General Discussion.
1. The neocortex, parahippocampal gyrus, and hippocam-
pus form a hierarchy in which episodic representations of
increasing complexity are formed.
2. Stimulus representations at different levels of complexity
may acquire different or even opposite associations.
3. Learning in the cerebellum is governed by the Rescorla–
Wagner rule. This explains why incremental learning is
modulated by outcome predictability.
4. Incremental learning is modulated by stimulus novelty,
Figure 3. Neuronal responses of a familiarity neuron, in this case located in area TE, to a visual stimulus either
presented for the first time (left) or repeated in a different session (first presentation in that session; right).
Reprinted from Neuropharmacology, 37, J. Z. Xiang and M. W. Brown, “Differential Neuronal Encoding of
Novelty, Familiarity, and Recency in Regions of the Anterior Temporal Lobe,” p. 665, Copyright 1998, with
permission from Elsevier.
Figure 4. Theory of the familiarity effect. Some cortical nodes code for
features that are more or less permanent in the current environment
(labeled “context”), and others code for phasic cues (labeled “stimulus”).
Each cortical node has a strong connection to one parahippocampal node
(the solid arrow). In addition, the cortical nodes send weak connections to
other parahippocampal nodes (connections to only one parahippocampal
node are drawn; the dashed arrows). a: When a phasic cue is presented
together with a set of more permanent context features, cortical nodes
coding for the context features are active synchronously with parahip-
pocampal nodes activated by the phasic cue. This will allow long-term
potentiation to occur in the connections from the cortical nodes to the
parahippocampal nodes. b: The strengthened connections now allow the
permanent context features to weakly activate the parahippocampal node
on their own. c: The resulting adaptation in the parahippocampal node will
make it less responsive to its preferred input, the phasic cue, which
produces the familiarity effect.
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as suggested by SOP, because firing to stimuli in the
parahippocampal gyrus decreases with increasing
familiarity.
5. Firing to familiar stimuli decreases in the parahippocam-
pal gyrus because stimulus representations become re-
sponsive to the context in which stimuli are presented.
Steps 1–4 do not depend on Step 5 being correct. They require
only that there is a difference between the parahippocampal activ-
ity elicited by novel and familiar stimuli, and this has already been
observed, as described above. Step 5 is one plausible way in which
this could occur (other theories of the familiarity firing decrement
are reviewed in the General Discussion).
Model Implementation
The five assumptions above have been implemented as a com-
putational model, which we describe here at a conceptual level.
Formulas and technical aspects of the implementation are rele-
gated to the Appendix.
The three representational modules are implemented as three
layers of linear input integrators with a continuous firing rate. The
architecture is loosely based on a model of episodic memory
(Meeter et al., 2002; Talamini et al., in press); feedback connec-
tions existing in that model are omitted here, and a more explicit
representation of neuronal activity is chosen. The cerebellar net-
work is taken from previous work (Gluck, Allen, Myers, &
Thompson, 2001; Gluck & Myers, 1993); in its basis, it is a simple
perceptron in which an input layer codes for stimuli and an output
layer codes for a CR. Weights between these layers are slowly
modified with the Rescorla–Wagner rule, so that the output of the
cerebellum comes to predict a target output (equivalent to the US).
Firing rate of the representational nodes is a thresholded, linear
function of cell activity, which is itself equal to summed inputs
multiplied by a factor accounting for adaptation. Adaptation is a
function of previous node firing rate, whereas inputs to a node
consist of node-specific excitation and undifferentiated feedfor-
ward inhibition. Feedforward inhibition is a linear function of the
total activity in the layer below, and excitation is a weighted sum
of the outputs of its nodes. Weights on the excitatory connections
can change through learning, governed by a variant of Hebb’s rule
often used in competitive learning, the Oja rule (Oja, 1982). This
rule models both LTP and heterosynaptic long-term depression
(LTD): Weights are strengthened when pre- and postsynaptic
nodes are both active and weakened when the postsynaptic node is
active while the presynaptic node is not. Time is discrete, with
iterations standing for 0.5 s.
Connections from the cortical to the parahippocampal layer are
not uniform. In the brain, distinct pathways carry distinct kinds of
inputs to the hippocampus, but these streams become more and
more intertwined as they make their way through the parahip-
pocampal gyrus (Witter, Wouterlood, Naber, & Van Haeften,
2000). In the model, this is simplified so that each parahippocam-
pal node receives a strong, topological connection from a corre-
sponding neocortical node and weak, distributed connections from
other neocortical nodes. Functionally, this scheme implies that a
parahippocampal node has a preferred stimulus it reacts strongly to
but also becomes weakly active in response to other inputs, mean-
ing that context can influence representations in the parahippocam-
pal layer. Indeed, parahippocampal primary neurons are known to
be stimulus selective in their responses but also to be contextually
modulated (Dusek & Eichenbaum, 1997; Suzuki, Miller, & Desi-
mone, 1997).
Connections from the parahippocampal layer to the hippocam-
pal layer are dense and fanning. They model the perforant path
projections from entorhinal cortex to dentate gyrus and hippocam-
pal field CA3, which have such characteristics (Witter et al.,
2000). This arrangement allows the hippocampal layer to form
ensemble representations, coding for the combination of all stimuli
in the parahippocampal layer. Compared with connections from
the cortical to the parahippocampal layer, initial weights are larger
in this connection, but this is balanced by the absence of the strong,
topological connections that are present in the lower connections.
Feedforward inhibition is proportional to initial weight strength
and thus also is higher in the parahippocampal-to-hippocampal
connections than in the cortex-to-parahippocampal connections.
The three representational layers send projections to each one
third of the input layer of the cerebellar network. Connections from
nodes in the representational layers to the cerebellar input layer are
all one to one. Auditory cortical areas are known to project to the
cerebellar cortex via the basilar pontine nuclei (Aitkin & Boyd,
1978). There is less evidence with regard to mesocortical afferents.
Anatomically, no direct projections from the hippocampal region
to the cerebellum have been found. However, indirect, polysynap-
tic connections have been suggested to exist (Berger, Weikart,
Bassett, & Orr, 1986). For example, a retrograde tracing study in
which viruses were injected in the cerebellum found that both the
hippocampus and the entorhinal cortex projected indirectly to the
cerebellum (Kaufman, Mustari, Miselis, & Perachio, 1996). More-
over, stimulation in field CA1 of the dorsal hippocampus leads to
a response in the cerebellum (Yu, Wang, & Chen, 1989). One
indirect pathway may be from the subiculum to the ventromedial
hypothalamus (Kohler, 1990), a region that itself projects to the
cerebellum (Haines, May, & Dietrichs, 1990). Another possibility
is that projections go via entorhinal and other cortical areas. (As
hippocampal outputs are processed in entorhinal deep layers while
feedforward processing takes place in the superficial layers of that
structure, the assumption of independence of parahippocampal and
hippocampal projections to the cerebellum would still be tenable.)
Nevertheless, until the existence of such indirect connections has
received stronger anatomical or neurophysiological support, it
remains a critical assumption of the model.
The effects of septal cholinergic innervation of the hippocampus
are modeled by including an extra learning phase whenever one of
two situations applies. First, following several models of episodic
memory (Hasselmo & Wyble, 1997; Meeter et al., 2004), septal
activity is assumed whenever parahippocampal inputs fail to elicit
activity in the hippocampus. Such lack of activity indicates a novel
situation. The mechanism assumed by these models, disinhibition
of the septum if firing in the hippocampus is low, is consistent with
data indicating an inhibitory effect of hippocampus on the septum
(Dragoi, Carpi, Recce, Csicsvari, & Buzsaki, 1999; McLennan &
Miller, 1974). The other situation in which we assume septal
activity, following Rokers et al. (2002), is in the presence of an
unpredicted US. Indeed, it has been found that a US tends to
activate the medial septum at the beginning of training, whereas
this activity tapers off when conditioned responses start appearing
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(Berger & Thompson, 1978b). In both situations eliciting septal
activity, a subset of nodes with the largest inputs undergoes LTP
and LTD with a larger learning parameter, modeling one of the
physiological effects of acetylcholine (Hasselmo, 1999).
Reported results are all averages from 10 replications.
Results: Episodic Memory
The primary goal of the model is to show how the hippocampal
region can have a role in both episodic memory and incremental
learning. First, we discuss the ways in which the present model
addresses findings in episodic memory.
Above, a distinction commonly made by theories of episodic
memory was described, namely that between familiarity and rec-
ollection. Norman and O’Reilly (2003) showed that many charac-
teristics of the two processes can be explained by assuming that
they are differently responsive to input overlap; see Yonelinas
(2001) for a presentation of a similar idea in a more formal
framework. Norman and O’Reilly equated familiarity with a signal
that varies continuously with the overlap of probes with previously
stored memories and recollection with a process that yields an
output only when the probe closely resembles a stored memory.
The left panel of Figure 5 shows how the strength of the two
signals depends on the overlap between the probe and previously
stored items. Familiarity follows input overlap nearly linearly,
whereas recollection only delivers a strong signal at large input
overlaps. The right panel of Figure 5 shows how this may explain
the relative usefulness of familiarity and recollection with different
kinds of lures. In recognition, targets (studied items) have to be
discriminated from unstudied lures. These lures can be similar or
dissimilar to targets, with similar lures overlapping in more fea-
tures with targets than dissimilar ones. The right panel of Figure 5
shows how the two signals differ for targets and similar and
dissimilar lures. As can be seen, targets can be separated quite
easily from similar lures with both a familiarity and a recollection
signal, but only in recollection is the difference between a target
and a similar lure large. (On a side note, Norman and O’Reilly,
2003, showed that very similar lures lead to retrieval errors, or
“false memories,” making recollection unreliable when such lures
are used.)
Here, we first show how our model produces both signals. We
then show how signal strength in our model depends on input
overlap in the same way as in Norman and O’Reilly’s (2003)
model.
Familiarity
To test the theory of familiarity presented in the introduction, we
presented a stimulus A twice to the parahippocampal layer in one
context. We then compared the response to the second presentation
of A with the response to a second, novel stimulus B. Each
stimulus was represented by 1 cortical node, active for 10 itera-
tions (i.e., 5 s), and was preceded by 20 iterations of only context
presentation. As in all further simulations, 15 active cortical nodes
represented context, active cortical nodes had an output of 0.5, and
inactive ones had an output of 0.
Figure 6a plots the response of the parahippocampal node max-
imally responsive to the first presentation of A. It shows that the
response to a repetition of A is indeed lower than that to a novel
stimulus B, replicating the basic finding (Li et al., 1993; Xiang &
Brown, 1998). Note that at the second presentation, the parahip-
pocampal node has started responding to context, which drives up
its adaptation and thus lowers its response to the stimulus.
The response decrement for repetitions occurs under a wide
range of parameter sets, but both its strength and the time course
of its induction are determined by parameter values. Three impor-
tant factors are weight change during one presentation (less change
will lead to a slower induction of the familiarity effect), adaptation
constants (stronger adaptation will lead to a stronger effect), and
the weight distribution at the onset of the simulation. Such factors
may partly explain the variability in neuronal responses to famil-
iarity reported by Xiang and Brown (1998). These authors ana-
lyzed responses as a function of two variables: repetition within
sessions and repetition in different sessions. The analysis led to
four types of neurons: Novelty neurons were those that reduced
their responses to both within-session and between-session repe-
Figure 5. Recollection and familiarity in Norman and O’Reilly’s (2003) model. Left: The familiarity (famil.)
and recollection (recoll.) signals to a probe decrease with decreasing overlap between the probe and previously
stored inputs. Right: Strength of both signals to studied items (targets), similar lures (simil. lures) that overlap
in 80% of features with targets, and dissimilar lures (dissim. lures) that overlap in 20% of features with targets.
The left panel was plotted with data from Norman and O’Reilly (2003).
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tition. They fired strongly to novel patterns, but not to any repe-
tition. Familiarity neurons were those that were influenced by
between-session repetitions but showed no significant effect of
within-session repetition. These neurons seemed to gradually de-
crease their firing with continued repetition. Recency neurons were
influenced by within-session repetition but not by between-session
repetition. They decreased their firing when a stimulus had been
presented recently but not when it had been presented in earlier
sessions. Finally, visually responsive neurons were not influenced
by repetition of any kind.
The results shown in Figure 6a represent a novelty neuron, one
that fires differently on the first presentation of a stimulus as
compared with all later presentations. It was produced using a high
parahippocampal learning rate (0.1). In the data of Xiang and
Brown (1998), responses to familiar patterns were only around
30%–50% of that to the original presentation. With a learning rate
of 0.1, the ratio of responses to novel and familiar stimuli was
around 50% (this drops to below 25% with even higher learning
rates).
Figure 6b shows the results with the low learning rate used in
the remaining simulations (0.01). Here, the effect takes shape
over a number of trials. This would make the node akin to
Xiang and Brown’s (1998) familiarity neurons, neurons whose
firing to familiar patterns (i.e., ones seen many times) is low-
ered as compared with that to unfamiliar stimuli, but not nec-
essarily showing a decrement in firing on the first repetition of
a pattern.
Simulating Xiang and Brown’s (1998) recency neurons
would necessitate the assumption of weight decay mechanisms,
which are not present in the model. If weights decayed between
sessions, neurons would decrement firing in response to repe-
titions within sessions but not across sessions. Xiang and
Brown’s (1998) novelty neurons also show stronger firing dec-
rements when a repetition is within a session than when it is in
another session, suggesting that such decay may exist for all
recorded neurons but is parametrically stronger in recency
neurons.
The fourth kind of neuron, visually responsive neurons
whose responses were no different for repetitions than for first
presentations, was actually the most common in the data set of
Xiang and Brown (1998). Very low learning rates could pro-
duce such neurons, but they may also be thought of as the
neurons coding that receive no or too few inputs from afferent
cells coding for contextual elements to be influenced by con-
text. In summary, variations in wiring, weight decay, and learn-
ing rate may produce the four kinds of neurons found by Xiang
and Brown (1998).
One further thing to note about Figure 6a is the transient nature
of much of the firing elicited by the stimulus. The strong firing in
the first time step that the stimulus is present quickly returns to
lower levels through adaptation. This is highly realistic: Even in
situations in which there is a sustained neural response to a
stimulus, the sustained response is usually preceded by a stronger
transient signal at stimulus onset (e.g., Lamme, Rodriguez-
Rodriguez, & Spekreijse, 1999; Tsujimoto & Sawaguchi, 2004;
Xiang & Brown, 1998). As a consequence, processing in our
model is biased toward stimulus onsets; even though context
representations are always larger than stimulus representations,
responses elicited by stimuli at onset are in the same range or
stronger than the summated response to all context elements. This
is important in our simulations of classical conditioning. As only
novel, phasically present stimuli elicit a large response in the
parahippocampal layer, the system will have a built-in, automatic
bias to associate a US with such stimuli instead of with constant
context elements.
Figure 6. Parahippocampal (parahip) coding of stimulus familiarity. a: Response of the parahippocampal node
to its preferred stimulus, with rapid learning from the cortical layer to the parahippocampal layer (  0.1). The
left panel shows the node’s response to a stimulus presented for the first time in a context (black bar along the
x-axis). The right panel shows a comparison of stimuli presented after this stimulus in the same context. If a
novel stimulus is presented (“new”), the response of the parahippocampal node coding for this stimulus is of the
same magnitude. If the first stimulus is repeated (“old”), the response is attenuated. b: Response of a
parahippocampal node to its preferred stimulus repeated 100 times in the same context, with slow learning from
the cortical layer to the parahippocampal layer (  0.01). The response slowly habituates with repeated
presentations.
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Recollection
A second way in which to query episodic memory is recollec-
tion or retrieval. This is usually modeled as pattern completion,
occurring after a pattern has been strengthened by Hebbian learn-
ing (Hasselmo & Wyble, 1997; McClelland & Goddard, 1996;
Meeter et al., 2004; Norman & O’Reilly, 2003; Talamini et al., in
press). To test whether our model would show similar behavior,
we performed a simulation in which a pattern was presented for
five time steps in a context (again represented by 15 cortical
nodes). Later in the simulation, either a degraded version of the
pattern (with 40% of features set to 0) or an entirely novel pattern
was presented in the same context. To allow for partial patterns,
we designed the patterns in our recollection simulations to consist
of 5 cortical nodes, whereas they consist of 1 cortical node in other
simulations. This does not change the results, as a pattern of 1
cortical node also elicits the creation of a new hippocampal
pattern.
Figure 7a plots parahippocampal and hippocampal activity in
the model, averaged over the whole layers as representations form
over time. In the first time steps, a hippocampal representation is
formed of the context. In the very first time step, no hippocampal
activation results from the large input; the random, initial weights
are not strong enough for hippocampal nodes to overcome feed-
forward inhibition (weaker feedforward inhibition and strong input
connections from the cortical layer to the parahippocampal layer
preclude such silencing by feedforward inhibition in the parahip-
pocampal layer). In vivo electrophysiological recordings have
indeed shown a period of several hundreds of milliseconds of
severely dampened firing in CA3 and CA1 following presentation
of a novel stimulus (Vinogradova, Kitchigina, & Zenchenko,
1998). The silence in the hippocampal layer triggers septal acti-
vation and the formation of a hippocampal pattern to represent its
input. In the next time step, a hippocampal pattern has been formed
and becomes active. Thereafter, both parahippocampal and hip-
pocampal activation decrease because of adaptation, until a plateau
is reached at around the 10th time step. At Time Step 16, the
pattern is presented (the black bar along the x-axis in left panel of
Figure 7a), leading to a strong response in the parahippocampal
layer and a second interruption of firing in the hippocampal layer.
Again, the random weights are not strong enough for hippocampal
nodes to overcome the feedforward inhibition resulting from the
new inputs. The interruption once more triggers septal activation,
and a hippocampal pattern is now formed to represent the item in
its context.
When the pattern is presented again in degraded form (see the
right panel in Figure 7a), it immediately activates its hippocampal
representation. A novel pattern does not activate it; instead, it
interrupts firing in the hippocampal layer for a third time. In the
next time step, this new pattern has itself been stored under
influence of septal activation. In the first time step in which a
pattern is presented, hippocampal activity thus distinguishes
sharply between old patterns, which elicit activity even in de-
graded form, and novel patterns, which do not. This contrast can
form the basis for recollection-based recognition in ways explored
by other models of episodic memory.
As a measure of pattern retrieval, we use the correlation over all
hippocampal nodes between the hippocampal representations of
the first pattern and either the degraded or the novel pattern. As can
Figure 7. a: Response of the parahippocampal (parahip) and hippocampal (hip.) layers (average response of all
nodes in each layer) to novel and old patterns. The left panel shows responses to the first presentation of a pattern
at Time Step 16 (black bar along the x-axis). The right panel shows the responses to either a novel (“new”)
pattern or a degraded (“degr.”) version of the first pattern (black bar along the x-axis). The degraded old pattern
immediately elicits activity. Novel patterns cause a pause in firing in the hippocampus in the first time step they
are presented. Acetylcholine-induced learning subsequently creates a pattern, which is active in later time steps.
The same is true for the first presentation of the context, at Time Step 1 (black arrow in the left panel). b:
Correlation of hippocampal activity elicited by the first pattern with that elicited by either the degraded version
of the first or the novel pattern. The response to the degraded pattern resembles that to the first pattern, whereas
the novel pattern generates an entirely new pattern of hippocampal activity, negatively correlated with the first
pattern.
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be seen in Figure 7b, this correlation was very large for the
degraded pattern but negative for the novel pattern. The full
hippocampal pattern was produced with partial cues, which con-
stitutes pattern completion in the hippocampus. Strengthened con-
nections between nodes in the parahippocampal and hippocampal
patterns underlie this pattern completion.
Comparison of Recollection and Familiarity
To investigate the relation between input overlap and parahip-
pocampal and hippocampal activity, we performed a simulation in
which the overlap between a first and a second stimulus was
systematically varied. A stimulus represented by five neocortical
nodes was presented once for five time steps in a standard context.
After a delay, a second five-node stimulus was presented that
overlapped in zero, one, two, three, four, or five nodes with the
first stimulus. The zero-overlap condition was equivalent to the
novel pattern condition in the previous simulation.
Figure 7 shows that parahippocampal and hippocampal re-
sponses to stimulus repetition are opposite: Whereas parahip-
pocampal nodes fire more strongly to a novel pattern, the hip-
pocampal layer responds more strongly to an old pattern. The same
pattern emerges when pattern overlap is systematically varied.
With decreasing overlap, and thus increasing pattern novelty,
parahippocampal responses increase while hippocampal responses
decrease (see Figure 8a). To ease comparison, we rescaled both
signals so that both were maximal at 100% overlap (i.e., straight
repetition of Pattern 1).1 As the inset in Figure 8a shows, our
model reproduces, though in an exaggerated way, the responses of
familiarity and recollection in Norman and O’Reilly’s (2003)
model to input overlap (see Figure 5a). Parahippocampal response
to the second pattern varies linearly with input overlap, whereas
hippocampal response depended in a very nonlinear way on input
overlap. As our model reproduces the central distinction between
familiarity and recollection in Norman and O’Reilly’s (2003)
model, it also reproduces their results on similar and dissimilar
lures (see Figure 8b).
The magnification of small differences between inputs to large
differences between hippocampal patterns also explains another
feature of the model. Although context alone and context plus
stimulus overlap in most features (namely, in all context features),
the addition of the stimulus nevertheless causes a whole new
pattern to be formed (see Figure 7). This is the case even when a
stimulus consists of a single node (because of adaptation to con-
text, at first presentation the stimulus will produce a large para-
hippocampal activity compared with the context; see Figure 6).
Discussion
Although our simulations of episodic memory are not very
elaborate, they can be seen as a proof of concept: They show that
our architecture is sufficient to model basic episodic memory
tasks, on the basis of either recall–recollection or familiarity. In the
case of recollection this is not surprising, as the model conforms in
many ways to the common denominator of computational models
of episodic memory. The idea that parahippocampal areas compute
a familiarity signal is also widespread (Aggleton & Brown, 1999;
Bogacz, Brown, & Giraud-Carrier, 2001; Norman & O’Reilly,
2003), but this signal is implemented here in a novel way: as a
decrease of parahippocampal activity caused by adaptation to the
current context. Several predictions that follow from this novel
implementation are given in the General Discussion.
Familiarity in our proposal is context-specific—to a lesser ex-
tent, this is also the case in other implementations of familiarity
1 The transformation for the parahippocampal response was (r100 
rx)/(r100  r0), where rx is the response to a particular level of overlap, r100
is the response to 100% overlap (i.e., to straight repetition), and r0 is the
response to 0% overlap (i.e., to a wholly new pattern). For the hippocampal
response it was (rx  r100)/(r0  r100).
Figure 8. a: Responses of the parahippocampal (parahip) and hippocampal (hip) layer to a second pattern with
varying overlap with an already stored pattern. Simulation structure is as in Figure 7. The average node output
in each layer on the first time step that the second pattern is presented divided by the average node output to
context alone is plotted. The inset shows layer activities replotted as familiarity and recollection signals, as in
Figure 5. b: Strength of both signals to studied items (targets), similar lures (simil. lures) that overlap in 80%
of features with targets, and dissimilar lures (dissim. lures) that overlap in 20% of features with targets.
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(see the General Discussion). In some theories, however, familiar-
ity is thought of as explicitly context free (e.g., Mandler, 1980).
The “butcher on the bus” phenomenon, the familiar face that we
cannot place because we see it outside the normal context, suggests
familiarity is context independent. However, there may also be
butchers on the bus who we miss completely because they evoke
no familiarity outside of their usual context.
In controlled studies, simple context manipulations sometimes
influence human recognition memory and sometimes do not. A
recent meta-analysis concluded, however, that a global context
shift (e.g., a room change) has as much effect on recognition as it
has on recall scores (Smith & Vela, 2001). This does not imply that
the two hypothetical underlying processes, familiarity and recol-
lection, are both context dependent. The two most pertinent studies
differ radically in their conclusion with regard to this question.
Macken (2002) concluded on the basis of the remember–know
paradigm that all context effects in recognition derived from the
contributions of recollection estimates and that familiarity was
context insensitive. McKenzie and Tiberghien (2004) found the
exact opposite result with a process dissociation procedure: small
context effects in recollection and large ones in familiarity esti-
mates. A factor that may play a role in these conflicting findings
is the timing of context presentations. In our model, context works
by slightly activating associated stimuli in the interval before they
are presented. When context and item information are attended to
at the same time, the effect of context should thus be attenuated or
eliminated. Macken (2002), who found familiarity to be unaffected
by context, presented context and item information at the same
time, which suggests they were also attended to at the same time.
In McKenzie and Tiberghien’s (2004) study, added context ele-
ments were presented before the item was, and opposite conclu-
sions were reached.
Although stimulus timing may thus be a factor, it is clear that the
question of the context specificity of familiarity is still open. The
question of whether all familiarity relies on the parahippocampal
context is also not wholly solved. It would be odd if, for example,
for faces specialized face processing systems (Farah, Wilson,
Drain, & Tanaka, 1998; Kendrick, da Costa, Leigh, Hinton, &
Peirce, 2001) do not also play a role in computing familiarity.
One aspect of context effects in recognition is that a context
change tends to result not only in a lower hit rate but also in a
lower false alarm rate (e.g., Macken, 2002). At first sight, this is
paradoxical, as it implies that a context shift lowers familiarity for
lures never presented in that context. It is, however, uncontrover-
sial if we think of items as represented by multiple features. If lures
overlap in some features with targets (studied items), neurons
coding for these features will show a familiarity firing decrement
in the old context but not in a new one. Therefore, firing would be
lowered for lures sharing features with targets in the old context,
but not in new ones. This implies that context effects should
interact with target–lure similarity, in that a context change should
affect false alarm rates more for similar lures than for nonsimilar
lures. This stands as a prediction of the model.
Results: Classical Conditioning
The previous section has shown how the model implements both
recall–recollection and familiarity. Recall–recollection is based on
the reactivation of compound representations formed at acquisi-
tion, and familiarity is based on the decreased responding to
familiar stimuli. The episodic memory simulations pave the way
for our work on classical conditioning. The familiarity effect
modeled in the parahippocampal layer implements the central idea
of SOP, described in the introduction, that only novel stimuli elicit
a state suitable for fast acquisition of responses to them. The
formation of episodic memories in the hippocampal layer allows
for conditioning to occur to complex, compound representations.
We first describe our simulations of basic conditioning. The role
of different representations in generating simple conditioned re-
sponses is investigated both through inspection of individual layer
contributions and through lesion studies. We then investigate sev-
eral paradigms from the classical conditioning literature. Our aim
in these simulations is twofold: to show that the intact model can
reproduce findings in the literature and to show that lesions in the
model have the same consequences for performance as they have
in experimental animals.
Basic Conditioning
In our simulations of classical conditioning, no attempt was
made to quantitatively fit animal data. Instead, we assumed a
generic setup in which an animal is placed in a context, is allowed
to familiarize itself with it, and is then subjected to 99 trials of
conditioning to a CS followed by a US. Context consisted again of
15 continuously active cortical nodes, with both the stimulus and
the US being represented by 1 active cortical node. A CS had a
duration of one time step (0.5 s) and was immediately followed by
a US also of one time step. Between each presentation of the
stimulus were 20 iterations (10 s) in which only the context was
active. As our measure of conditioning we took the output of the
cerebellar network, which we assume to be monotonically related
to the likelihood of a CR.
The left panel of Figure 9 shows how the output of the cerebel-
lum in the time step after a CS rises with increasing numbers of
presentations of the CS. It also shows the decomposition of the
output into contributions from inputs from the three layers. These
were computed by summing the contribution to cerebellar output
of cerebellar nodes receiving input from a particular layer. As can
be seen, the hippocampal and parahippocampal layers contribute
most to the generation of cerebellar output, with the cortical
contribution rising slowly throughout training. The fact that para-
hippocampal and hippocampal contributions rise faster than those
of the cortical layer is the result of strong responses to novel
stimuli: Whereas in the cortex the CS is just one of many active
elements, it generates a much larger signal in the parahippocampal
layer because it is novel and only phasically active. Because
hippocampal output is a function of parahippocampal input, the CS
elicits strong activity also in this layer. The CS thus generates a
stronger signal in parahippocampal and hippocampal layers, mak-
ing it easier for the cerebellum to form a CS–US connection using
inputs from these layers. Later in learning, parahippocampal re-
sponses to the more and more familiar CS decrease. The advantage
of the parahippocampal CS representation over its cortical prede-
cessor thus disappears, which results in that later in learning, the
cortical CS representation accrues more strength as a CR elicitor in
the cerebellum (see later portion of learning curve in the left panel
of Figure 9).
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The hippocampal contribution does not come right at the onset
of training. The right panel of Figure 9 shows performance on the
first 10 trials. The hippocampus starts contributing to cerebellar
output only after a few trials. In those trials, a hippocampal
representation of the CS-context combination has to be formed and
then strengthened under influence of the septum.
Figure 10 shows cerebellar output to the context alone.
Throughout the whole training episode, the model correctly gen-
erates no CRs to context alone. Underneath this nonresponse lies
a revealing pattern: Through the training, hippocampal and to a
lesser degree parahippocampal inputs come to drive the cerebel-
lum to incorrectly emit a CR to context alone, a tendency that is
inhibited only through negative contributions from the cortical
layer. This reflects pattern completion: The context alone is part of
the pattern of context and stimulus and will therefore weakly
activate the hippocampal representation of the context–stimulus
ensemble even in the absence of the stimulus. Moreover, it will
weakly activate parahippocampal stimulus representations. The
context alone thus comes to prefigure the stimuli that regularly
appear in it and therefore activate CS–US associations that were
formed within it.2 Although that may sound like an intuitive
finding, it leads to the counterintuitive prediction that individual
elements making up the context come to have negative predictive
value during training. They should thus function as mild inhibitors
when presented in a different context. This could be tested in an
experiment in which animals are classically conditioned in a
context X. Salient elements of that context could be removed and
later placed back. Removal of the elements should lead to in-
creased responding, and returning them to the context should lead
to a drop in responding.
Effects of Lesions
To investigate the roles of different layers, we repeated the
above simulation with one or more layers lesioned. Three lesions
were investigated. In one, the hippocampal layer was removed,
modeling a selective hippocampal lesion in animals. In the second,
both the hippocampal and the parahippocampal layers were re-
moved, modeling a broader hippocampal region lesion. Finally, we
investigated selective lesions of the medial septum by not applying
the extra learning phase under influence of acetylcholine. In this
simulation, only base-rate learning occurred in the hippocampus.
We made the assumption that after a lesion of a representational
layer, remaining inputs become stronger through the compensatory
2 Activation of the context-CS ensemble in the context-alone situation
will also weaken its association with the US, as no US follows context-
alone presentations. This counteracts further learning of the CS–US asso-
ciation, which is another reason for the stagnant parahippocampal and
hippocampal contributions to the CR.
Figure 9. Acquisition of cerebellar response over 100 trials in which a conditioned stimulus is combined with
an unconditioned stimulus. Both the total cerebellar response (thick black line) and the contributions of the three
sources of cerebellar inputs (hippocampal layer [hip], parahippocampal layer [parahip], and cortical layer [ctx])
to this response are shown. The right panel shows the first 10 trials, highlighting that the hippocampal
contribution starts only after a few trials.
Figure 10. Cerebellar response to context alone, measured on the itera-
tion before presentation of a stimulus. Although the total response is
stable at 0, the different inputs acquire different values: Hippocampal (hip)
inputs provide a drive toward a conditioned response, requiring the other
inputs to actively inhibit a conditioned response. ctx  cortical; parahip 
parahippocampal.
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processes generally seen when an area or neuron is partly deaffer-
entiated: Synapses from remaining connections grow larger and
more numerous (Robertson & Murre, 1999). This was modeled by
multiplying remaining inputs to the cerebellum with a factor
representing the proportion of inputs lost (i.e., if only the hip-
pocampal layer was lesioned, remaining inputs were multiplied by
1.5; if both the hippocampal and parahippocampal layers were
lesioned, remaining inputs were multiplied by 3).
Under this assumption, CS–CR associations were formed at the
same speed after lesions of the hippocampal and/or parahippocam-
pal layers as in the intact model (see Figure 11a). Acquisition of
the CR was slowed substantially only after a septal lesion. Gluck
and Myers’s (1993) model makes the same predictions, for the
same reason. With removal of the hippocampal region, cortical
inputs still support the formation of CRs to simple stimuli. After a
septal lesion, no new representations are formed in the hippocam-
pal layer, but hippocampal outputs are still projected to the cere-
bellum. In both Gluck and Myers’s (1993) model and in the current
one, no hippocampal input is better than a dysfunctional hip-
pocampal region input. This pattern is consistent with findings
from rabbit eyeblink conditioning (see Figure 11b): Acquisition of
an eyeblink response to a simple cue is not impaired after hip-
pocampal region lesions (Schmaltz & Theios, 1972) or selective
lesions of the hippocampus (Allen, Padilla, Myers, & Gluck, 2002)
but is slowed after medial septal lesions (Allen, Padilla, & Gluck,
2002).
In our model, the results depend critically on the assumption of
synaptic compensation. Although the weight multiplication factor
can be somewhat below the level of total compensation, if it were
dramatically lower or if compensation did not occur in the cere-
bellum, lesions to the hippocampal or parahippocampal layer
would affect the speed of conditioning.
The lesions discussed above were made before training. Lesions
can also be made during or after training. What the model would
predict in such cases can be gleaned from Figure 9, by comparing
the full cerebellar response to what it would be if one or more
components were missing. The hippocampal and parahippocampal
layers play a large role in generating cerebellar output early in
training, with the cortical layer contributing substantially only later
in training. If the hippocampus is lesioned early in training, per-
formance will thus suffer to a large extent, with the effect becom-
ing gradually smaller if the lesion is made later in training. In a
similar vein, Figure 9 shows that a lesion encompassing parahip-
pocampal regions as well as the hippocampus proper will affect
performance in all stages of training. Our model thus predicts no
effects of both types of lesions when they are made before training
but effects of varying strength when they are made during or after
training. Although we know of no data showing these effects for
classical conditioning, they have been found in fear conditioning,
in which lesions sufficient to cause retrograde amnesia (i.e., loss of
trained responses) hardly affect the acquisition of new responses
(Anagnostaras, Gale, & Fanselow, 2001).
Sensitivity to Context in the Intact and Lesioned Model
If after conditioning in one context, the response is tested in
another, a decrement in performance is often found (Penick &
Solomon, 1991). It is as if a change in context removes part of the
cues for the CR. This effect is not universally found, however.
Reviewing many experiments, Myers and Gluck (1994) suggested
that the amount of training is an important determinant, with
response decrements likely if the context is changed early in
training but less likely if the context is changed after extensive
training.
Figure 12a shows how cerebellar output changes in the model
when context is changed after a certain number of trials. The effect
of context change is relatively large after 30 trials but becomes
smaller later in training, as was argued to be the case in experi-
mental animals (Myers & Gluck, 1994). Gluck and Myers’s (1993)
model explained this pattern by a tuning of representations. Early
Figure 11. a: Conditioned stimulus–unconditioned stimulus learning in rabbit eyeblink classical conditioning:
Only medial septal (MS) lesions reliably slow acquisition (control and MS data are from Allen, Padilla, & Gluck,
2002; hippocampal-region [H] lesion data are from Allen, Chelius, & Gluck, 2002; selective hippocampal [H]
lesion data are from Allen, Padilla, Myers, & Gluck, 2002; all studies used same stimulus parameters and
procedure). b: Results of simulations with classical conditioning under different lesions. As in the data, only MS
lesions slow acquisition. CRs  conditioned responses.
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in training, the CS and context are part of a single representation;
later in training, representations for the rewarded CS and the
unrewarded context become more and more separate. Our model
produces the same pattern for a similar reason: Early in training,
the hippocampal layer plays a larger role in generating cerebellar
output than it does later in training (see Figure 9). As the hip-
pocampal layer codes for stimulus–context ensembles, CRs thus
depend on representations that are highly context laden early in
training but less so later in training. This leads to gradually smaller
context effects with more training. Both the current model and
Gluck and Myers’s (1993) model predict that overtraining should
eventually abolish context effects.
Figure 12b shows the effects of a context change after 30 trials
for lesioned models. A decrement is only seen in the intact model.
There was no context shift decrement after a hippocampal region
lesion. Penick and Solomon (1991) showed that context change
effects were indeed abolished following hippocampal lesions (see
Figure 12c). In the model, responses are even strengthened by a
context change after such a lesion. This results from the fact that
familiarity decreases responses in a context-dependent way. A
change of context will therefore increase the parahippocampal
response to the CS. As cerebellar output is a linear function of its
inputs, this increase in parahippocampal response will translate
into a larger cerebellar output, resulting in more, not less, respond-
ing in the new context. In several data sets, responses are indeed
larger in the novel context than in the old one after hippocampal
lesions. This has been found in rabbit eyeblink conditioning (see
Figure 12c) and also in rat operant conditioning (Honey & Good,
1993). It is unclear whether this effect was reliable in these data
sets; so, it stands as a prediction of the model. The model further
predicts disruption of context effects by septal lesions, which also
remains to be tested empirically.
Blocking
Blocking refers to the phenomenon that an animal will not learn
a connection between a stimulus and an outcome (say, a US) that
is already well predicted. As in that of Gluck and Myers (1993),
the model’s explanation for blocking relies on the presence of a
prediction error term in the Rescorla–Wagner rule describing
learning in the cerebellum (see the Appendix). A well-predicted
US does not elicit learning in the cerebellum, because there is no
prediction error to drive learning. As this effect depends on the
cerebellum, lesions in the hippocampal region should not affect it.
Figure 12. Effects of context change on cerebellar output. a: In the intact model, output is smaller after a
context switch. This effect is large early in training and disappears with more trials. b: Lesions including those
either in the hippocampus or in the medial septum abolish the context change effect. c: In rabbit eyeblink
conditioning, control rabbits show decrement in learning the conditioned response (CR) when the conditioned
stimulus is presented in a new context. This decrement is abolished following ablation of the dorsal hippocampus
(data are from Penick & Solomon, 1991). H  hippocampal; H  hippocampal region; MS  medial septal.
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This is indeed what was found in the model. After 99 trials in
which stimulus A was paired with a US, 99 trials were given in
which stimulus A was joined by another stimulus B. In the last
trial, only stimulus B was presented. A strong blocking effect was
found in all conditions, consisting of no responding to B alone. No
lesion abolished the blocking effect (see Figure 13a). This repli-
cates experimental findings (see Figure 13b) in that neither hip-
pocampal lesions (Allen, Padilla, Myers, & Gluck, 2002) nor
medial septum lesions (Baxter, Gallagher, & Holland, 1999) abol-
ish blocking.
Hippocampal lesions do have a more subtle effect, however. In
intact animals, introduction of the novel cue causes a temporary
drop in the rate of responding (Allen, Padilla, Myers, & Gluck,
2002; Rokers et al., 2002). This novel cue effect (see Figure 13d)
is abolished after hippocampal lesions (Allen, Padilla, Myers, &
Gluck, 2002). Our model reproduces these findings, as the novel
cue causes a new hippocampal representation to be formed, dis-
rupting older representations that underlie part of the cerebellar
output. Figure 13c compares output on the last trial before the
introduction of the new stimulus with output on the 10 trials after
introduction. Consistent with the rabbit data, a decrement in re-
sponse was found in the intact model but not in the model with
hippocampal lesions. The predictions for the broader hippocampal
region and medial septal lesions remain to be tested empirically.
Learned Irrelevance and Latent Inhibition
Learned irrelevance and latent inhibition are produced, in the
model, through the effects of familiarity. A novel cue elicits strong
firing in the parahippocampal region, which makes it easy to attach
significance to the cue. Familiar stimuli elicit much weaker firing,
rendering conditioning to such stimuli more difficult. This then
results in learned irrelevance or latent inhibition.
In our latent inhibition simulation, stimulus A was first pre-
sented for 99 trials on its own. Subsequently, A was paired with a
US for another 99 trials. In such situations, responses are acquired
more slowly than in a control condition with no stimulus preex-
posure. The model reproduced this finding: In the latent inhibition
condition, a response developed more slowly than in a control
condition in which the model was given only context exposure
prior to the 99 CS–US pairings (see Figure 14). At this point, the
CS in the control condition was novel and thus elicited large
Figure 13. a: Blocking in the intact model and all lesion conditions, measured as the decrease in cerebellar
response to a stimulus B alone as compared with the response to a compound, AB. b: Blocking in rabbit eyeblink
conditioning is intact in animals with selective hippocampal lesion, as measured by the decrease in responding
to B in a blocking condition and in a control condition in which only B has been paired with the unconditioned
stimulus. c: The novel cue effect: The decrement in cerebellar response on the first trial that AB is presented,
as compared with the last trial on which A alone is presented. d: Novel cue effect in rabbit eyeblink conditioning:
Decrement in first AB block, for both sham-lesioned controls and rabbits with selective hippocampal lesions
(data in b and d are from Allen, Padilla, Myers, & Gluck, 2002). H  hippocampal; H  hippocampal region;
MS  medial septal; CR  conditioned response.
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responses in the parahippocampal nodes. This made it easy for the
cerebellar layer to attach predictive value to the CS. In the latent
inhibition condition, the CS was familiar during the CS–US pair-
ings and thus did not elicit strong parahippocampal responses
anymore.
In the learned irrelevance condition, a CS and US were both
presented 99 times during a first training phase, but in an unpaired
fashion (each US was presented somewhere in the 20 time-step
interval between two CS presentations). In a second phase, the CS
was paired with the US for 99 trials. This produced slower learning
than in the control condition (same as in the latent inhibition case;
see Figure 14). Again, predictive value is more easily attached to
novel stimuli than to stimuli with which the animal has become
familiar.
Although latent inhibition is a robust phenomenon, it is gener-
ally eliminated by a change in context between the two learning
phases (Mackintosh et al., 1991; Symonds & Hall, 1995). As was
already discussed, SOP predicts this finding, and as the current
model is in a sense an implementation of SOP, it is no surprise that
the model also reproduces the finding. In our simulation, we
presented a stimulus for 99 trials in Context 1 and then paired it for
99 trials with the US in Context 2. Learning now proceeded at the
same speed as in the nonexposed control condition (see Figure 14).
A context change restores parahippocampal firing to the level of a
novel stimulus and therefore allows conditioning to the stimulus to
occur at normal speed.
In additional simulations, we investigated the sensitivity to
lesions of latent inhibition and also of the effect of context change.
The results were unambiguous: Because in our model latent inhi-
bition is a result of the lower parahippocampal firing in response
to familiar stimuli, only lesions involving the parahippocampal
layer interfere with latent inhibition (see Figure 15). This was
indeed found in rabbit eyeblink conditioning: Parahippocampal
(specifically, entorhinal cortex) lesions did interfere with latent
inhibition, whereas lesions restricted to the hippocampus proper
did not (Shohamy et al., 2000). Although septal lesions have not
yet been investigated in this paradigm, learned irrelevance was still
present with systemic injections with scopolamine, which disrupt
septohippocampal cholinergic projections (Moore, Goodell, & So-
lomon, 1976). The sparing of latent inhibition by medial septal
lesions stands as a prediction of the model.
General Discussion
Although at first blush episodic memory and incremental learn-
ing seem to pose contradictory demands, the computational model
presented in this article shows how the two may in fact be com-
plementary. The properties of episodic representations in the
neocortex, parahippocampal gyrus, and hippocampus proper may
explain phenomena in classical conditioning. The model repro-
duces the effects of hippocampal, septal, and broad hippocampal-
region lesions on classical conditioning and its contextual modu-
lation. This is done while respecting gross brain anatomy and
taking into account many findings from neurophysiology and
neuropharmacology.
What the Model Accounts For or Can Account For
Many theories of episodic memory distinguish between two
outputs of memory: familiarity and recollection. We have de-
scribed how each output may arise from different parts of the
hippocampal region, as has been argued previously by others
(Aggleton & Brown, 1999; Norman & O’Reilly, 2003; Yonelinas,
2002). A familiarity signal may arise from parahippocampal cor-
tices, and a recollection–recall output may be provided by the
hippocampus proper. Our model diverges from others only in how
the familiarity signal arises: as a decrease in signal due to increas-
ing contextual sensitivity.
Our simulations of episodic memory are essentially a proof of
principle. We showed that familiarity and recollection have the
same characteristics in our model as they have in other models.
Familiarity is sensitive to the overlap between the memory probe
and stored memories. Recollection is sensitive to strong overlap
with a single memory and will generate complete memories to
degraded cues. These characteristics help to simulate a large num-
ber of findings from episodic memory, as has been shown by
others (Humphreys et al., 1989; Norman & O’Reilly, 2003; Ta-
lamini et al., in press; Yonelinas, 2001). Our current model would
have to be scaled up to entertain such simulations, however, as it
is currently too small to support storage of lists of items.
The characteristics of familiarity and recollection were used to
simulate several paradigms of incremental learning. Ensemble
representations formed in the hippocampal layer could explain the
drop in CRs when a CS is presented in a new context. It could also
explain the novel cue effect in blocking. The drop in parahip-
pocampal response to stimuli with increasing familiarity repro-
duced learned irrelevance and latent inhibition. The fact that para-
hippocampal representations include contextual information
produces a release from learned irrelevance and latent inhibition
with context change.
We did not attempt to quantitatively fit precise experiments. We
did this for several reasons. One was that because of the simplicity
of the cerebellar model, its output is not directly comparable to the
number of CRs emitted by the animal. Direct fitting would have
required a mapping function, which because of a lack of data
Figure 14. Acquisition of a cerebellar response in a control condition
with extended context exposure, in a latent inhibition (inh.) condition in
which conditioned stimulus–unconditioned stimulus (CS–US) contingency
is preceded by preexposure trials to the CS, in a condition in which the
context is changed between preexposure and learning (latent inh. ctxt), and
in a learned irrelevance (irrel.) condition in which both the CS and US are
presented before learning but in an uncorrelated fashion.
576 MEETER, MYERS, AND GLUCK
would have been arbitrary. Instead, we chose to do all simulations
with one fixed set of parameter values and present our results as
qualitative fits of known effects. This does mean, however, that
effect sizes in simulations cannot be compared with those in
experiments—only their direction can be validly compared.
The results are quite robust for changes in the parameter values.
One parameter that does have a strong impact is the relative size of
a context representation as compared with a CS representation.
Representing a context by too few nodes can lead to a domination
of hippocampal representations by the CS, eliminating context
effects. Too large context representations make learning slow, as it
takes the cerebellum more time to pick up the CS “signal” in the
context “noise.” Other important parameters are those governing
the balance between LTP and LTD in the model. If LTP is too
strong as compared with LTD, “runaway synaptic modification”
(Hasselmo, 1994) occurs, preempting the creation of useful hip-
pocampal representations. Too strong LTD would lead to contin-
uously dwindling weights, which is not a very realistic model of
memory. Parameters with mostly quantitative effects (i.e., on the
size but not the direction of effects) are the relative balance
between layer inputs to the cerebellum and the parameters gov-
erning learning, septal activity, and adaptation (not all sets pro-
duced strong familiarity effects).
The model lends itself quite naturally to extensions into operant
conditioning, similar to how Myers and Gluck (1996) expanded
their model to apply to operant data by incorporating multiple
output nodes and making reinforcement contingent on output
responding. More paradigms of episodic memory could also
be incorporated, as could conditioned fear. This does not mean
that successful extension is guaranteed. Notably, our model cur-
rently does not include a realistic source of variability, which
precludes simulation of all characteristics of distributions of re-
sponses. Our model currently exhibits only some sampling vari-
ability in hippocampal representations, which is why 10 replica-
tions of each simulation were sufficient. Future editions of the
model will need to address this point (see Norman & O’Reilly,
2003, for an excellent discussion of the issue of variability in
neural networks).
Figure 15. a: Cerebellar output after 200 trials in a control condition, latent inhibition condition, and latent
inhibition with context (ctxt) change condition for the intact model and all lesion models. b: Latent inhibition
in rabbit eyeblink conditioning: Entorhinal cortex (EC) lesions but not selective hippocampal (H) lesions disrupt
the effect (data are from Shohamy et al., 2000). c: Systemically administered scopolamine during conditioned
stimulus (CS)–unconditioned stimulus exposure, which among other effects disrupts septohippocampal projec-
tions, does not disrupt learned irrelevance in rabbit eyeblink conditioning (data are from Moore et al., 1976).
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. H  hippocampal region; MS  medial septal; CR 
conditioned response; Sit Exposure  control condition in which the animal is exposed only to the cage.
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What the Model Does Not Account For
There are also data that the model does not account for and
aspects of the model that are clear simplifications. The rich liter-
ature on extinction is a case in point. Many complex phenomena in
this literature implicate the hippocampus (Frohardt, Guarraci, &
Bouton, 2000), and our model seems ideally placed to make a
contribution to this literature. However, preliminary simulations
showed that it already fails to provide an adequate explanation of
extinction at a low level. It often takes much longer to extinguish
a CR to a stimulus than it takes to learn it, as if the system errs on
the side of caution. However, preliminary simulation showed that
our model extinguishes a response at approximately the speed at
which it acquires them, as do other associative models of condi-
tioning. This is because the Rescorla–Wagner rule at the core of
our cerebellar model decreases the CS–CR association after an
omission (CR with no US) in the same way as it increases that
association after a commission (no CR before the US). However,
recent research has suggested that the cerebellar mechanisms be-
hind acquisition and extinction of CRs are different (Krupa &
Thompson, 2003).
Another area in which improvements could be made is the time
course at which hippocampal responses occur during conditioning
(Berger & Thompson, 1978a). It takes more trials to develop
strong responses in the rat than it takes here, and they start off as
responses to the US, which here they do not. It would be possible
to fit these data, as we have incorporated the US in the input to the
hippocampus. In the current setup that would not serve any pur-
pose; a model on a more fine time scale might be needed to give
meaningful interpretations to the data. Although this leaves some-
thing to be explained, it does not challenge the model as it stands.
The model does not make a contribution to a long-standing
discussion in the episodic memory literature, namely whether
episodic memories are consolidated in the neocortex (for review,
see Meeter & Murre, 2004). Both the view that they are consoli-
dated in the neocortex (McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly,
1995; Meeter & Murre, in press; Squire & Alvarez, 1995; Squire,
Cohen, & Nadel, 1984) and the view that they are not (Nadel &
Moscovitch, 1997; Nadel, Samsonovitch, Ryan, & Moscovitch,
2000) could be reconciled with the current model.
An area to which the model also does not make a contribution
is the timing of responses and the influence of timing of condi-
tioned and unconditioned stimuli on the acquisition of responses.
Here, we chose for a CS lasting one time step and a US that
immediately follows the CS, which makes the model not dissimilar
to trial-based models with added context-only trials (e.g., Gluck &
Myers, 1993). In contrast with trial-based models, however, the
explicit representation of time makes our model essentially capa-
ble of being extended to other timing regimes. Two additions
would be necessary. Delay conditioning could be simulated by
making the elicited CR part of the input of the cerebellar layer, as
has been shown previously (Gluck et al., 2001). The second
addition would be a loop between the parahippocampal and hip-
pocampal layers, as has been implemented in models of episodic
memory (e.g., Talamini et al., in press). This would allow repre-
sentations to remain active in both regions through reverberations,
as has indeed been observed between the hippocampus and ento-
rhinal cortex (Iijima et al., 1996). Reverberatory representations
could be used to form associations in trace conditioning tasks, in
which CS and US are not coactive. Indeed, some evidence has
pointed to the hippocampus as being necessary in delay condition-
ing (Clark, Manns, & Squire, 2001; Clark & Squire, 1999).
Relation to Previous Models
The model is a variant of associative memory theories, and as
such it has many of the strengths and weaknesses of these theories
(e.g., in the field of extinction). It has borrowed heavily from two
associative theories in particular, that of Rescorla and Wagner
(1972) and SOP (Wagner, 1981), bringing the latter from an
abstract level to a neurobiologically testable level (see also
Donegan et al., 1989). Central elements of both theories are
implemented in the current model.
The current model replaces and builds on Gluck and Myers’s
(1993) model of corticohippocampal function in classical and
operant conditioning (Gluck & Myers, 1993, 2001; Myers &
Gluck, 1994, 1996; Myers, Gluck, & Granger, 1995) and its
extensions to septohippocampal interactions (Myers et al., 1996;
Rokers et al., 2002) and cerebellar function in eyeblink condition-
ing (Gluck et al., 2001; Gluck & Thompson, 1987). The imple-
mentation of the cerebellum and septohippocampal system were
adapted from these models. The implementation of the hippocam-
pal region was changed—there as an autoassociator and here as a
hierarchy of representational layers. This allowed us to circumvent
three limitations of the previous model: that it was anatomically
imprecise (remedied only to a degree in the current model), that it
placed unobserved error-correcting learning in the hippocampus,
and that it did not create room for episodic memories in that
structure. It also means that at a mechanistic level, the two models
differ substantially. An example is the speed at which representa-
tions are formed. Whereas in the previous model representations
were slowly tuned under influence of behavioral contingencies,
here we take the episodic memory perspective in which the bulk of
hippocampal learning occurs at the first confrontation with a novel
situation or stimulus and in an unsupervised fashion.
At a more functional level, however, many explanations of the
current model are very similar to those of the earlier framework.
As an example, we consider the proposed mechanisms behind
latent inhibition. In Gluck and Myers’s (1993) model, this phe-
nomenon is explained through a hippocampal region-mediated
compression of the CS with the context during the first phase of
training, in which the CS and US are presented in an uncoupled
fashion. This makes the task of learning a CS–US association in
the second phase of training hard, as the model cannot differentiate
between context alone and context plus CS. In the current model,
compression of CS and context into one representation occurs in
the hippocampus, but it is not necessary for latent inhibition.
During the first phase of learning, the CS stops eliciting a strong
response in its habitual context (the familiarity effect), and this is
assumed to underlie latent inhibition. Although the details of both
explanations differ, they bear family resemblance: Both assume
that the CS has more or less “faded” into the background context
during the first phase of learning. At a more abstract level, the two
models thus deliver similar explanations for the findings in the
conditioning literature. They also share many predictions, such as
a declining influence of context on classical conditioning.
As was already mentioned, the model is also similar to many
neural network models of episodic memory. The structure of its
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representational layers was loosely based on a model of episodic
memory (Meeter et al., 2002; Talamini et al., in press), and its
behavior in the episodic memory simulations is similar to that of
other episodic memory models (Hasselmo & Wyble, 1997; Mc-
Clelland & Goddard, 1996; Meeter et al., 2004; Norman &
O’Reilly, 2003). Our assumptions about septal activity are also
widely shared by episodic memory models (Hasselmo & Wyble,
1997; Meeter & Murre, in press; Meeter et al., 2004).
In many respects, the current model thus merely pulls together
threads that were evident in earlier models of the hippocampus. In
at least two aspects it is different from those other models:
1. In its explicit modeling of the interaction between the
cerebellum and episodic representations stored in the
hippocampal region.
2. In how sensitivity to context in parahippocampal repre-
sentations leads to lower responses to familiar stimuli.
Comparison With Theories of Familiarity
The proposed explanation of the familiarity effect is not the only
one, however. It has been suggested that a few perirhinal neurons
coding strongly for the stimulus show increased firing rates, which
in turn inhibit other neurons (Norman & O’Reilly, 2003). Because
there would be more neurons with decreased responses, these
would be the ones observed in studies of familiarity neurons. The
observed decreases may also reflect neurons that lose out in the
self-organization phase in which a new representation is formed
for a novel stimulus (Sohal & Hasselmo, 2000). Both proposals
suggest that whereas firing is decreased in many neurons, it is
increased in “winners,” those neurons that really code for the
stimulus. However, although Xiang and Brown (1998) recorded
from hundreds of neurons, none showed an increase in firing rate.
One model suggests one reason why such increases might not,
in fact, occur. In the model of Bogacz et al. (2001), winners inhibit
themselves via feedback loops. Although firing is increased in the
first milliseconds after a stimulus appears, it is quickly extin-
guished, leading to an overall decrease in firing during repetitions
even in these winners. With some parameter settings, Norman and
O’Reilly’s (2003) model could behave in a similar way. The initial
increase in firing frequency was not found by Xiang and Brown
(1998); they noted that from the first spike on, firing rates are
lower for familiar stimuli. However, it is possible that noise in
response times causes the initial increase to be invisible, as the
graphs of Xiang and Brown (1998) are averaged over many trials.
Bogacz and Brown (2002, 2003) also proposed another model,
in which familiarity neurons activated strongly by a novel stimulus
undergo LTD instead of LTP. This so-called anti-Hebbian model
provides an elegant explanation for the reduced firing to familiar
stimuli, because winners firing strongly at the first presentation of
a stimulus will, through LTD, limit their firing during repetitions.
The model does not depend on inhibition for the decrease and does
not predict firing increases in any group of neurons. However, it
presupposes that LTD occurs between highly active pre- and
postsynaptic neurons, which is counter to the standard situations in
which LTD occurs and has yet not been observed in neurons
(Bogacz & Brown, 2003).
Another advantage of the anti-Hebbian model is its large theo-
retical capacity: With the same number of neurons, a model based
on anti-Hebbian learning could store many more patterns than
some models based on Hebbian learning (Bogacz & Brown, 2003).
Models based on Hebbian learning increase their capacity, how-
ever, by including homosynaptic LTD—LTD observed when a
presynaptic neuron is active but the postsynaptic neuron is not
(Bogacz & Brown, 2002). This lowers the correlation between
neurons not involved in coding for the same pattern, and a math-
ematical analysis has shown that an on-average positive correla-
tion between firing in different perirhinal nodes is the main lim-
iting factor in the capacity of a perirhinal memory store (Bogacz &
Brown, 2003). Such LTD was not needed in the current model, but
it could be included without changes to the simulations.
In summary, all published models of the familiarity effect as
well as the current proposal leave something to be proven. The
proposals based on inhibition or reorganization would seem to
require either an increase in the firing frequency of some famil-
iarity neurons, either continuously or immediately after a stimulus
has been presented. This has not been observed, but it is possible
that averaging over trials obscures the increase. The current pro-
posal and anti-Hebbian learning may be easier to reconcile with
existing data, but both make strong claims that have so far not been
tested. The current proposal suggests that the familiarity effect
should diminish with context change and even disappear with a
total context change. The anti-Hebbian model suggests that LTD
should dominate LTP in the perirhinal cortex.
As already stated in the introduction, the current implementation
of familiarity could be replaced by other theories without endan-
gering most simulation results. There is one caveat, however. One
effect, latent inhibition, does depend on an aspect of the theory,
namely on the context dependence of familiarity. As discussed in
the introduction, SOP explains the context dependence of latent
inhibition by assuming that the context of learning brings repre-
sentations in a state of low activity. The equation of familiarity
with this state in SOP is thus only possible if familiarity is context
dependent. Familiarity is indeed context dependent in our imple-
mentation, and it also would be in the theory of Norman and
O’Reilly (2003), in the anti-Hebbian learning model, and in the
theory of Sohal and Hasselmo (2000). In all three, context features
would presumably be part of the input to parahippocampal–medial
temporal lobe cortex–perirhinal modules and thus be partly re-
sponsible for the match between study items and test probes.
Comparison With Complementary Learning Systems
Norman and O’Reilly’s (2003) model of episodic memory is an
instantiation of a broader framework, dubbed Complementary
Learning Systems (McClelland et al., 1995; O’Reilly & Rudy,
2000). Within the same framework, O’Reilly and Rudy (2001)
presented simulations both of tasks that could be seen as episodic
and of paradigms from incremental learning. Their focus in the
latter is on operant and fear conditioning. They simulated four sets
of findings: nonlinear discrimination problems, contextual fear
conditioning, transitivity problems, and context-sensitive respond-
ing. In the latter three sets, the simulations rely on pattern com-
pletion in their hippocampal system as the causal mechanism. In
particular, O’Reilly and Rudy showed how the hippocampus could
build up a compound representation of context, which could be-
come associated for example with a shock in the contextual fear
paradigm. Because pattern completion is also essential to the
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functioning of our hippocampal layer, our model would simulate
these sets in the same way as their model (although it would
require a theory of the formation of context representations that
would take into account the role of stimulus novelty in our model).
In the last case, that of context-sensitive responding, this is obvi-
ous from our simulations of the same phenomenon in classical
conditioning. The first set, of nonlinear discrimination problems,
would be treated fundamentally differently in our model than in
their framework.
Nonlinear discrimination problems are those in which patterns
of stimuli that are not linearly separable must be discriminated by
the animal. An example is negative patterning, a paradigm in
which two stimuli, A and B, predict a reward, but their combina-
tion, AB, does not. In most experiments, experimental animals will
take a long time to correctly respond to A and B, but not to AB.
Such tasks require a separate representation for the combination
AB, which can then be associated with different consequences than
the individual stimuli A and B. Such compound representations
would naturally be formed in our hippocampal layer, and indeed
many models of hippocampal functioning would predict that the
hippocampus is necessary for negative patterning and similar
nonlinear discrimination problems (Sutherland & Rudy, 1989).
However, experiments have shown that animals with hippocampal
lesions can still perform on such tasks (Alvarado & Rudy, 1995;
Davidson, McKernan, & Jarrard, 1993), although they are often
slowed compared with normal animals (Alvarado & Rudy, 1995;
Rudy & Sutherland, 1995). This seems to require compound
representations (i.e., for the compound AB) outside of the hip-
pocampus. In O’Reilly and Rudy’s (2001) model, the cortex can
form these representations through error-correction learning. In
our model, such representations would automatically be formed,
because stimuli occurring simultaneously form each other’s con-
text. Parahippocampal nodes coding for A would thus become
“loaded” with B just as they become loaded with context. If some
such nodes received inputs coding for B and others did not, their
differential responses to the AB compound could form the basis for
nonlinear discriminations such as negative patterning.
The different ways in which the two models deal with negative
patterning point to a major difference, namely in learning rules.
O’Reilly and Rudy’s (2001) model assumes that two forms of
learning, Hebbian and error-correction learning, are present in both
the cortical and the hippocampal memory systems. Hebbian learn-
ing underlies performance in episodic tasks, whereas error correc-
tion is important for the incremental learning simulations. This
seems unparsimonious, but a justification could be that the differ-
ence reflects task demands: Error signals are important in incre-
mental learning tasks but not in episodic memory tasks. Our main
argument not to follow their assumption is that error signals and
error-driven learning have not been observed in the hippocampus
or in the cortex (although see O’Reilly, 1996, for a defense of
error-driven learning in cortical areas). This contrasts with the
cerebellum, where error-driven learning has been convincingly
demonstrated (Kim et al., 1998; Thompson & Gluck, 1991), and
with the basal ganglia and amygdala, which could operate under
similar regimes (see the introduction). The result of this difference
is that in O’Reilly and Rudy’s model, representations are tuned by
error correction, whereas in our model representations are strictly
episodic and tuning occurs in the connections from the represen-
tational layers to output systems such as the cerebellum.
There are, however, also many features in which the Comple-
mentary Learning Systems framework overlaps with the one laid
out in this article. For example, the hippocampus in both frame-
works automatically forms rapid compound representations of the
situation, and these representations explain context dependence in
incremental learning tasks. At a more fundamental level, the two
agree in that the same memory representations may underlie very
different forms of learning in animals (as expressed by classical,
operant, and fear conditioning) and in that there is a fundamental
continuity between human and animal memory tasks. They also
overlap in what is a fundamentally associative view of incremental
learning: In both models, representations of stimuli are associated
with outputs that drive responses.
Comparison With Comparator Theories
The strongest contrast is probably between our model, firmly in
the associative tradition, and comparator theories (Gallistel, 1990;
Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000; Gibbon & Balsam, 1981; Miller &
Matzel, 1988). The latter theories claim that conditioning is not a
matter of forming associations between stimuli and responses but
that it involves estimations as to when an emitted response will be
rewarded. Gallistel and Gibbon (2000) have made a convincing
claim that current associative theories are incomplete and have not
yet resolved certain internal inconsistencies within the associative
framework. We agree that there are phenomena, especially in the
timing domain, for which associative theories do not fully account.
We hope to be able to extend our model in that direction.
Nevertheless, there are also areas in which associative theories
offer better explanations than timing theories, notably in describ-
ing context effects. For example, it is not obvious within a frame-
work such as rate estimation theory (Gallistel, 1990; Gallistel &
Gibbon, 2000) why context change would eliminate latent inhibi-
tion, as the expectations generated by stimuli are not affected by
context in these models. The biggest drawback of comparator
theories, however, is that most are entirely functional, with few
guidelines as to how they might be implemented in the brain.
Associative theories have an advantage here, as shown perhaps
most clearly by findings on the cerebellum and the Rescorla–
Wagner rule (Kim et al., 1998; Thompson, 1990). Perhaps when
comparator theories are made biologically more plausible and
associative theories are brought to bear on timing issues, they will
converge onto a common framework.
Untested Predictions
Many predictions follow from the model as it stands. As a favor
to our future falsifiers, we end with a simple enumeration of these.
We start with those that follow exclusively from our theory of
familiarity and from its dependence on context:
1. If there is a change in context between presentations of a
stimulus, no firing decrement should be observed in
parahippocampal areas.
2. Familiarity estimates should show context dependence.
3. Familiarity should depend on context being present be-
fore the stimulus is presented.
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4. A context change should affect false alarm rates more for
similar lures than for nonsimilar lures.
5. Decrements in firing to familiar stimuli in parahippocam-
pal areas should be preceded by increases in background
firing rate in the same cell, reflecting on stronger sensi-
tivity to context alone.
Other predictions do not depend on our theory of familiarity
being correct, although some rely on the fact that familiar stimuli
elicit smaller parahippocampal responses (as has been found).
Predictions 6, 7, and 8 are shared with Gluck and Myers’s (1993)
model; the others are not.
6. A lesion to the hippocampal region after training will
affect even simple conditioned responses that can be
learned normally if the lesion is made before training.
7. The effect of a lesion to the hippocampal region on a
conditioned response will be larger during early phases
of training (when hippocampal representations play a
relatively large role; see Figure 9) than later in training.
8. Overtraining will abolish or severely limit context
change effects in classical conditioning.
9. Medial septal lesions will abolish context change effects
in simple conditioning.
10. Context effects in simple conditioning will be in the
opposite direction in animals with lesions restricted to
the hippocampus proper: They will show an increment
in responding after context change.
11. Individual elements making up the context come to have
negative predictive value during training. They should
thus function as inhibitors when presented in a different
context.
Although vigorous testing of these and other predictions of our
model will almost certainly prove it wrong in details (and perhaps
wrong in its entirety), we believe that the model highlights an
advantage of computational modeling: that knowledge from dif-
ferent task domains and brain areas can be integrated into one
coherent framework and lead to testable predictions. With more
and more knowledge being generated about the brain, we believe
that such an integrating function will become more and more
essential.
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Appendix
Representational Layers
Both the cortical and the parahippocampal layers consist of 33 nodes,
enough to code for 2 contexts of 15 nodes, 2 stimuli of 1 node, and a US.
The hippocampal layer consists of 40 nodes. Weights between the cortical
and parahippocampal layers are of two kinds. Each cortical node has an
immutable connection with weight 1.8 with 1 parahippocampal node. With
all other parahippocampal nodes, cortical nodes have connections subject
to learning that are initialized at values taken from a uniform distribution
with mean .05 and a 25% spread. Parahippocampal nodes are in turn
connected to 85% of hippocampal nodes with connections subject to
learning; weights on these connections are initialized at values taken from
a uniform distribution with mean .3 and a 10% spread.
The parahippocampal and hippocampal layers consist of simple firing
rate nodes that compute an output from linearly summated inputs. Input to
the cells, gi, consists of excitation, Ei, and inhibition, Ii, both originating
from the layer below. Excitation, unique to each node, is a weighted sum
of the output of the layer below; the inhibitory component, modeling
undifferentiated feedforward inhibition, is a fraction of the summed output,
the same for all nodes:
gi  Ei  Ii  wijoj  oj,
where oj is the output of presynaptic node j and wij is the weight on its
connection to node i. The inhibition fraction  is set to a value 1.2 times
the average weight at the outset of the simulation (0.06 from the cortical to
the parahippocampal layer, and 0.36 from the parahippocampal to the
hippocampal layer), so as to strongly inhibit nodes that are not part of a
cued memory. A node’s output is a function of its input gi, and (through
adaptation) of its own previous firing record. With t as the time index,
oit  git  1  Ait  H git
and
	Ait  Ai t 1  	oit 1.
H is the Heavyside step function that maps negative values and zero to 0
and positive values to 1, and 1  A(t) is an adaptation function. The
accretion parameter 	 of adaptation is set to 0.5, its gain parameter  to 0.9,
and its decay constant  to 0.1. This implies a slow recovery from
adaptation (seconds instead of milliseconds), as is indeed present in at least
some subtypes of neocortical (Fleidervish, Friedman, & Gutnick, 1996)
and hippocampal (Sah & Clements, 1999) neurons.
Learning is implemented with Oja’s rule:
	wij  
oj o
i1  wij  1  ojo
iwij.
This variant of Hebb’s rule seems to describe LTP well (Levy, Colbert, &
Desmond, 1990) and allows learning to asymptotically approach a plateau
whose level is determined by the strength of the input oj and the balance
between  and . A modified output level o’i is used in the learning
rule, which is equal to oi  0.4, truncated at zero. Only strongly firing
nodes are thus allowed to learn. This models data showing that the
threshold for LTP is usually higher than the firing threshold.
The positive learning rate  is set at 0.01 for the connections from the
cortical layer to the parahippocampal layer (except in the first familiarity
simulation, where it was set at 0.1). For the connections from the parahip-
pocampal layer to the hippocampal layer, it is set at 0.05. The negative rate
 was set to 0.5   in all connections.
Septal Activity
Learning under the influence of acetylcholine is implemented in the
connection of the parahippocampus to the hippocampus. This was not done
in great detail. Learning under the influence of acetylcholine is triggered
whenever fewer than three hippocampal nodes have an output of more than
0.05 (i.e., when patterns were new) or whenever prediction error in the
cerebellum is higher than 0.5. In these cases, the 6 nodes with the highest
inputs are allowed to strengthen the weights on their connections from the
parahippocampal layers according to the following rule:
	wij  
ojoi1  wij  0.5
1  ojwij.
Here oi is the output of the ith hippocampal node, oj is the output of the jth
parahippocampal node, and  is the cholinergic input [10 in case of a novel
pattern, 1.5  (error  0.5) in case of septal activation through error].
Weight change is bound to the interval [0.25, 0.3].
Cerebellum
The cerebellar network is the same as that in earlier work (Gluck, Myers,
& Thompson, 1994), consisting of a simple perceptron trained with the
Rescorla–Wagner rule:
	woi  coo  tooi,
where (oo  to) is the error of the output node (its output minus its target)
and oi is the output of the ith input node. The target of the output node is
the presence of a US on the next iteration (1 if present, 0 if absent). There
are 99 input nodes, with 33 getting input from each 1 context node
(transmitted via weights of strength 1), 33 more getting input from each 1
parahippocampal node (transmitted via weights of strength 1), and the last
33 getting connections with strength 0.5 from each of a random 15% of
hippocampal nodes. Weights between the input layer and output node are
initialized at values taken from a uniform distribution between .05 and
.05. The learning rate c is set at 0.05 in all simulations.
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